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We examine whether the COVID-19-induced policy responses by countries moderated 
the negative impact of the pandemic on industrial productivity. Using a panel of the 
50 most affected countries by the pandemic, we show that the policy responses do 
not only help reduce the spread of COVID-19, but they also moderate its negative 
impact on industrial productivity and help steer countries back to their growth paths. 
We demonstrate that, in the absence of the pandemic, some of the policy responses 
(i.e., lockdowns, travel restrictions, etc.) would have reduced productivity. We further 
demonstrate that our estimates are robust when considering alternative specifications 
of our productivity model. Our study provides strong support for evidence-based 
policies and emphasizes, consistent with theoretical arguments, that an optimal policy 
mix is fundamental to steering economies back to their steady productivity growth 
paths when facing negative shocks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The ongoing novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic negatively impacted global 
financial markets, economies, and social welfare (see Sha and Sharma, 2020; 
Sharma and Sha, 2020, for an overview). To prevent further damages to economies 
and financial markets as well as to limit or eradicate the virus, policymakers 
implemented several policies, including lockdowns, cancellation of public events, 
face coverings, and fiscal and monetary measures (quantitative easing and fiscal 
stimulus packages), among others (Phan and Narayan, 2020; Iyke, 2020a). On 
the academic front, a growing body of research explores the degree of COVID-
19’s impact and whether these policy responses have been effective in terms of 
curtailing the negative impact of COVID-19 (see Devpura and Narayan, 2020; 
Haroon and Rizvi, 2020; Iyke, 2020b; Narayan, 2020a). Despite this, the literature 
has not explored the role of these policy responses in moderating the impact of 
COVID-19 on industrial productivity. This is perhaps due to the limited nature 
of industrial productivity data, which is not available at daily but at lower 
frequencies. To address this research gap, our study pools countries together to 
form a panel dataset and uses the resulting dataset to test our hypothesis that the 
policy responses moderated the impact of COVID-19 on industrial productivity. 
Our hypothesis is motivated by the growing literature showing that extreme 
events like COVID-19 are associated with negative sentiments or extreme 
uncertainty that can reduce economic and financial activities (Behera and Rath, 
2021; Chen et al., 2020; Haldar and Sethi, 2020; Iyke, 2020c, Iyke and Ho, 2021; 
Salisu and Akanni, 2020). The contagiousness of COVID-19 and the deaths 
associated with it caused panic and fear. From a theoretical perspective, the adverse 
information associated with the pandemic causes financial frictions by raising 
default risk and the cost of borrowing, which hurt investment and productivity 
(see Bernanke et al., 1999; Christiano et al., 2014). Similarly, the pandemic may 
also cause people to consume less to save for unexpected events (like infections 
and deaths), leading to demand shortages, surplus of goods, and low incentive 
to produce goods (see Basu and Bundick, 2017). The bad news associated with 
COVID-19 increases the option value of waiting, consistent with irreversibility 
of investment theory, which reduces productivity (see Bernanke, 1983). In turn, 
the conducive policy responses like expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, 
investment in vaccine development, and coordinated efforts to limit the spread of 
COVID-19, among others, will revitalize economies via boosting consumption and 
consumer confidence. 
To test our hypothesis, we collect monthly data on industrial production 
indices, policy responses to the coronavirus pandemic, measures of COVID-19 
(cases and deaths per million), and conditioning information on the 50 most affected 
economies by COVID-19 across the globe spanning the period from January 2020 
to March 2021. Our main model regresses the annualized growth in the industrial 
production indices on the lag of COVID-19 related deaths per million, lag of policy 
response indicators, lag of the interaction of COVID-19 related deaths per million 
and the policy response indicators, and the lag of the conditioning information. In 
our robustness checks, we estimate various specifications of this model, including 
replacing COVID-19 related deaths per million with COVID-19 related cases per 
million, and using detrended and natural logarithm of industrial production as 
measures of industrial productivity. 
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Our estimations deliver the following findings. First, we show that the 
COVID-19-induced policy responses across these countries did not only help 
reduce the COVID-19 spread, but they also succeeded in moderating the negative 
impact of the pandemic on productivity and revert the economies to positive 
productivity growth paths. Second, in the absence of the pandemic, some of 
these policy responses—travel restrictions, bans on social events, lockdowns, 
etc.—would have hurt industrial productivity in these countries1, suggesting that 
their implementation was timely to mitigate the destructive impact of COVID-19. 
Third, we demonstrate that these findings are robust using productivity models 
featuring COVID-19 related cases per million (in place of COVID-19 related deaths 
per million), and detrended and natural logarithm of industrial production (as 
measures of industrial productivity). Together, our findings provide support 
for evidence-based policy responses in times of crises. One implication is that, 
when negative shocks hit economies, measured policies such as packages to assist 
businesses, stimulus packages to households to smoothen consumption, small but 
significant interest rate cuts to reduce the cost of borrowing, etc. are necessary 
to keep them afloat. Such policies have both immediate and long-term positive 
spillovers and are social welfare enhancing.
Prior studies have assessed the impact of COVID-19 on various facets of 
economies and financial markets and whether policy responses mitigate the 
negative consequences of the pandemic have delivered positive outcomes. For 
example, COVID-19 caused: a decrease in the labor force participation rate (Bauer 
and Weber, 2021); a decrease in consumption and investment (Yu et al., 2020); and a 
contraction in output and credit (Barro et al., 2020; Choi, 2020; Liu et al., 2020). Past 
studies show that the COVID-19-induced policy responses have a mixed impact 
on various aspects of the economy. Ashraf (2020) shows that social distancing 
measures reduced COVID-19 cases and stock market returns, whereas awareness 
programs, quarantine, and testing policies increased stock market returns. Yang 
and Deng (2021) finds that government interventions like contact tracing, testing, 
and social distancing magnified the negative impact of the pandemic on stock 
returns. Baig et al. (2021) show declining liquidity and stability of stock markets 
following the implementations of COVID-19 induced lockdowns and other 
restrictions. Bannigidadmath et al. (2021) demonstrate that COVID-19 related 
government policies generally have a negative impact on stock markets. Feng et 
al. (2021) find that the various policies implemented by governments, including 
public awareness campaigns and restrictions on internal movements reduced 
COVID-19 induced exchange rate volatility. Similarly, Zaremba et al. (2021) show 
that government interventions significantly decreased sovereign bond volatility. 
Padhan and Prabheesh (2021) provide an extensive survey of the literature. By 
and large, no study assesses whether the policy responses by countries succeeded 
in moderating the negative impact of the pandemic on industrial productivity. 
Our study contributes to the literature in this regard by showing that the policy 
responses have been effective in moderating COVID-19’s impact on productivity. 
Our analyses also contribute to the literature on the optimal policies in times of 
1 This is true even for economic support packages in normal times because they do not encourage 
hard work but shift capital to unproductive sectors of the economy. 
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crises (see Assenza et al., 2020; Kahn and Wagner, 2021; Mitman and Rabinovich, 
2020; Moser and Yared, 2020). It shows that an optimal policy mix (fiscal, monetary, 
and other policies) is necessary to overcome a crisis. The paper proceeds as follows. 
In Section II, we detail our data and methodology. Section III presents the results, 
while Section IV concludes the paper.
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Data
In this study, we use monthly data of 50 countries severely impacted by the 
COVID-19 pandemic over the period from January 2020 to March 2021. These 50 
countries are listed in Panel B of Table 1. Note that some countries have missing 
observations on some variables in certain months. Hence, our panel data is 
unbalanced. We use the annualized growth rate of industrial production indices 
as our dependent variable (see Panel A of Table 1, for the computation of this 
variable). The industrial production indices are sourced from the from Bank of 
Indonesia. We consider the following three groups of datasets as our explanatory 
variables. The first group of explanatory variables include five proxies of policy 
response indicators to the pandemic, namely stringency index, stringency legacy 
index, government response index, containment and health index, and economic 
support index. Data on all these policy response indices are downloaded from the 
Blavatnik School of Government database. 
The second group of explanatory variables include two measures of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, namely total number of cases (per million) and total 
number of deaths (per million) for each country. These COVID-19 measures are 
sourced from the online published database, namely Our World in Data (see 
www.ourworldindata.org). The final set of variables used in this study are the 
following four control variables, namely short-term interest rates, money supply 
(M2), inflation rate (measured as the growth rate of consumer price index), and 
stock price. Detail description of all variables considered for this study is given in 
Panel A of Table 1. 
Table 1. 
List of Variables and the Selected Countries
This table shows the list of variables—their short, full names, and definitions, where applicable—the sources from 
which we gathered data on them, and the selected countries. 
Panel A: List of Variables
Variable Full Name Source(s)
Industrial productivity 
variables
IP Industrial production index Bank of Indonesia
∆IP Annualised growth rate of IP, which we calculated as 
∆IPi,t=[ln(IP)i,t/ln(IP)i,t-1]*100 for IP i in period t.
Authors’ 
computation
dIP Detrended IP, which involves regressing IP on the trend 
and subtracting the best fit line from IP (or extracting 
the error term from the regression). 
Authors’ 
computation
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Table 1. 
List of Variables and the Selected Countries (Continued)
Panel A: List of Variables
Variable Full Name Source(s)
COVID-19 variables
TC Total COVID-19 cases per million Our World in Data
TD Total COVID-19 deaths per million Our World in Data
Policy response variables
SI Stringency Index, which measures the strictness of 
lockdown policies. 
Blavatnik School of 
Government
SL Stringency Legacy Index, which approximates the 
intuition of the original version of the Stringency Index 
and measures the strictness of lockdown policies.
Blavatnik School of 
Government
GI Government Response Index, which measures the 
variation of government response over all indicators.
Blavatnik School of 
Government
CH Containment and Health Index, which measures 
containment and health policies by combining 
measures of lockdown closures and restrictions 
with others like contact tracing and testing policy, 
investments in vaccine investments, and short-term 
healthcare investments.
Blavatnik School of 
Government
ES Economic Support Index, which measures 
governments’ economic support like debt relief and 
income support (stimulus packages) for households 
and businesses impacted by COVID-19.
Blavatnik School of 
Government
Conditioning variables
M2 Money Supply (broad money) CEIC
∆M2 Annualised growth rate of M2, which we calculated as 
∆M2i,t=[ln(M2)i,t/ln(M2)i,t-1]*100 for M2 i in period t.
Authors’ 
computation 
IR Short-term interest rate Bloomberg and 
CEIC
CP Consumer price index inflation Bank of Indonesia
SP Stock price index Bloomberg and 
CEIC
∆SP Annualised growth rate of SP, which we calculated as 




Argentina Georgia Malaysia Serbia
Austria Germany Mexico Slovakia
Bangladesh Hungary Morocco South Africa
Belarus India Netherlands Spain
Belgium Indonesia Pakistan Sweden
Brazil Iran (Islamic Republic of) Panama Switzerland
Bulgaria Iraq Peru Turkey
Canada Israel Philippines Ukraine
Chile Italy Poland United Arab 
Emirates
Colombia Japan Portugal United Kingdom
Czechia Jordan Romania United States of 
America
Ecuador Kazakhstan Russian Federation —
France Lebanon Saudi Arabia —
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B. Methodology
Our approach to examining the hypothesis that the conducive policy responses like 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, investment in vaccine development, 
and coordinated efforts to limit the spread of COVID-19, among others, will 
revitalize economies via boosting consumption and consumer confidence is as 
follows. We first examine whether the industrial productivity of the panel of 50 
countries are significantly negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic by 
employing the following regression model:
Next, to examine whether the policies adopted during the pandemic eased the 




In Equations (1) and (2), ∆IPi,t denotes an annualized growth form of industrial 
production of country i at time t and lnTD denotes the total number of deaths 
per million due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Xi,t’ represents four control variables, 
namely change in money supple (∆M2), short-term interest rate (IR), inflation rate 
(CP), and stock returns (∆SP). The indicator lnPol denotes policy response variables, 
namely stringency index (lnSI), stringency legacy index (lnSL), government 
response index (lnGI), containment and health index (lnCH), and economic 
support index (lnES). The operator ln denotes that variables considered Equations 
(1) and (2) are in natural logarithm form and since we have five measures of policy 
response, we estimate Equation (2) five times by considering each measure at 
a time in the regression model. Additionally, we estimate Equations (1) and (2) 
using the fixed-effects estimator (by controlling year and country fixed effects) and 
cluster standard errors at the country level. 
III. MAIN FINDINGS
This section is organized into three parts. In the first part, we discuss some key 
statistical features of the data. The second part of the section explains the findings 
from the panel regression models discussed in Section II. In the final part of this 
section, we discuss the robustness check of our main findings.
A. Preliminary Results
We begin by reporting in Table 2 selected descriptive statistics for variables used 
in this study. Descriptive statistics are reported for raw variables in Panel A, 
whereas Panel B reports descriptive statistics of variables in the form considered in 
regression models, mainly in natural logarithm or growth form. We report mean, 
maximum and minimum values, and Standard Deviation (SD) for all variables 
in columns 2 to 5, respectively. In the final column, we report the number of 
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observations for each variable. We note that the mean growth rate of industrial 
production is negative during the pandemic, while for other variables considered 
in the study, the mean is found to be positive. We also noted an average of 11,983 
positive COVID-19 cases and 300 deaths (per million) are recorded during the 
pandemic for the panel of 50 countries. Additionally, for all five policy response 
indicators (namely SI, SL, GI, CH, and ES) and four control variables (M2, IR, CP, 
and SP) positive mean are reported.
Table 2. 
Summary Statistics
This table shows summary statistics of the variables. These statistics are the mean, maximum, minimum, Standard 
Deviation (SD), and total observations. ∆ denotes annualized changes (growth) in a variable. ln denotes the natural 
logarithm operator. Panels A and B contain summary statistics of the raw and transformed variables, respectively, 
computed for a panel of 50 countries over the sample period from January 2020 to March 2021. Note that M2 is in 
millions in Panel A.
Panel A: Raw Variables
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum SD Observations
IP 110.427 451.720 10.943 45.555 528
TD 296.672 1904.895 0.000 396.553 687
TC 11983.888 115368.576 0.000 17912.023 691
SI 58.972 100.000 0.000 25.795 700
SL 64.662 100.000 0.000 25.626 700
GI 54.635 87.760 0.000 21.614 698
CH 55.321 89.580 0.000 21.718 700
ES 50.143 100.000 0.000 32.030 697
M2 706.535 31300.200 -0.442 3884.719 610
IR 2.810 40.000 -0.842 4.945 602
CP 5.653 157.859 -2.890 17.138 745
SP 35567.432 1904324.000 21.000 178697.985 684
Panel B: Transformed Variables
∆IP -0.062 202.153 -189.715 17.280 478
lnTD 4.077 7.553 0.000 2.388 687
lnTC 7.197 11.656 0.000 3.348 691
lnSI 3.963 4.605 1.022 0.690 675
lnSL 4.088 4.605 1.273 0.606 675
lnGI 3.869 4.475 0.445 0.727 682
lnCH 3.892 4.495 0.582 0.691 684
lnES 4.064 4.605 2.526 0.413 557
∆M2 1.136 135.751 -143.630 12.818 563
∆SP 0.330 49.793 -60.176 8.972 633
Next, we read the panel unit root test results from Table 3. More specifically, 
we test the null hypothesis of “panel unit root” using the Levin, Liu, and Chu 
(LLC, 2002) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS, 2003) panel unit root tests. We find 
that, irrespective of the tests used, our results are consistent for all variables. More 
specifically, we reject the null hypothesis of panel unit root at 1% significance level 
for all variables. This indicates, all variables considered in the panel regression 
models (discussed earlier in Section II) follow a stationary process. 
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Table 3. 
Unit Root Test Results
This table reports the unit root test results. We test for unit roots using the Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) and Im-Pesaran-Shin 
(IPS) tests. Panels A and B considered constant only and constant and trend, respectively, in the test regressions. 
p-values are in the parentheses.
Panel A: Constant Panel B: Constant and Trend
Variable LLC (p-value) IPS (p-value) LLC (p-value) IPS (p-value)
∆IP -19.243 -10.239 -17.068 -4.599
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnTD -78.402 -45.326 -83.341 -33.937
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnTC -67.057 -51.112 -2.470 -27.849
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000)
lnSI -64.278 -37.264 -111.159 -47.369
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnSL -56.170 -31.403 -98.623 -47.707
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnGI -61.200 -47.000 -185.675 -74.296
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnCH -48.689 -36.276 -64.500 -37.294
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnES -9.531 -4.250 -15.742 -3.496
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆M2 -15.417 -13.704 -20.760 -12.274
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IR -33.784 -23.034 -38.171 -14.690
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CP -4.191 -2.862 -4.216 1.196
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.884)
∆SP -25.622 -16.579 -23.421 -11.813
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
B. Empirical Findings
First, we discuss results reported in Table 4, which we have obtained by estimating 
Equation (1). Here, we examine whether COVID-19 has a negative effect on 
industrial productivity of the panel of 50 countries. We estimate Equation (1) five 
times and report respective results in columns 2 – 6. In model 1, we regress ∆IP 
on one period lag of lnTD. This is a baseline model, which contains no control 
variables. In the remaining four models, we introduce each control variable 
(namely ∆M2, IR, CP, and ∆SP) one by one to check the robustness of our findings. 
Overall, we find that COVID-19 pandemic (proxied using one period lag of lnTD) 
has a statistically significant and negative effect on productivity in 3/5 models. In 
models (1) and (5), we find that lnTD is statistically insignificant, however the sign 
is still negative. Thus, we conclude that the industrial productivity of the panel of 
50 countries declined due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This is supported by Figure 
1, which shows that industrial productivity experienced a decline as the economies 
recorded substantial growth in COVID-19 deaths. Productivity continued to fall, 
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recording a mean growth rate of -27% by April 2020, before climbing back to and 
above the baseline as policymakers bring down COVID-19 deaths towards zero 
through restrictive measures, extensive awareness campaigns, investment in 
hospital facilities, etc. 
Table 4. 
Impact of COVID-19 on Industrial Productivity
This table reports the impact of COVID-19 on productivity growth across countries. We regress industrial productivity 
(measured by annualized IP growth) on lags of lnTD, ∆M2, IR, CP, and ∆SP. Coefficients and p-values are outside and 
inside parentheses, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 3.966 6.633 7.581 7.559 4.710
(0.124) (0.098) (0.057) (0.053) (0.168)
lnTDit-1 -1.051 -1.659 -1.624 -1.630 -0.942
(0.124) (0.097) (0.080) (0.090) (0.201)
∆M2it-1 0.010 0.013 0.012 0.014
(0.168) (0.152) (0.126) (0.040)






R2 0.337 0.335 0.342 0.342 0.476
Adjusted R2 0.248 0.236 0.236 0.234 0.387
Figure 1. 
Industrial Productivity and Growth in COVID-19 Death Dynamics
This figure shows the behavior of mean industrial productivity and mean growth in total COVID-19 deaths per 
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Next, we examine whether the different policies adopted during the pandemic 
helped eased the negative effects of COVID-19 on industrial productivity by 
estimating Equation (2). These results are reported in Table 5. Here we consider five 
different policy response indicators, (namely SI, SL, GI, CH, and ES), and report 
results in columns 2 – 6, respectively. Our findings are as follows. First, we note 
that ln TD, which proxies the COVID-19 pandemic has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on productivity. Second, we observe that ln POL, which captures 
the effect of the policy responses during the pandemic also has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on productivity. Our findings are consistent with 
the use of 4/5 different policy response indicators. The only exception is model 5, 
whereby we use ES as a proxy for the policy response indicator. It is important to 
note that the ES index measures governments’ economic support like debt relief 
and income support (stimulus packages) for households and businesses impacted 
by the pandemic and, therefore, the effect of such policies will have a positive 
effect on countries productivity.2 
In the remaining four models, the negative and statistically significant effect 
of policy responses on industrial productivity is not surprising because these 
policy response indicators mostly capture very restrictive measures—such as, 
lockdowns, cancellation of public events, restrictive movements, face covering, 
and travel bans amongst others—which indeed will not help in boosting the 
productivity of a country but will help in containing the spread of the virus and 
should curtail the negative effects of COVID-19 on productivity. Therefore, to 
2 For details, see https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/covid-19-government-
response-tracker. 
Figure 1. 
Industrial Productivity and Growth in COVID-19 Death Dynamics (Continued)
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empirically ascertain that the negative effects of the pandemic on productivity can 
be moderated by imposing different policies, we have included an interaction of 
COVID-19 measure, ln TD, with the policy response indicators, ln POL, in Equation 
(2). We find that the effect of the interaction variable (lnTD*lnPOL) is positive and 
statistically significant on productivity of the panel of 50 countries in 4/5 models. 
Thus, our findings imply that imposing such restrictive policies during the 
pandemic does not only help reduce the spread of the virus but also helps dilute 
the negative effects of the pandemic on countries industrial productivity. The 
only exception is model 5, where the sign of the interactive variable is negative. 
As we mentioned earlier, the policy indicator, ES index, measures governments’ 
economic support like debt relief and income support (stimulus packages) for 
households and businesses impacted by the pandemic, which means that it should 
cushion productivity against the negative COVID-19 shock.
Table 5.
The Role of Policy Responses
This table shows empirical evidence regarding whether policy responses moderated the impact of COVID-19 on 
productivity growth across countries. We regress productivity (measured by annualized IP growth) on lags of lnTD, 
lnPOL, lnTD*lnPOL, ∆M2, IR, CP, and ∆SP. In Columns (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5), we include policy response indicators 
SI, SL, GI, CH, and ES, respectively. Coefficients and p-values are outside and inside parentheses, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 38.467 39.151 37.927 41.361 -39.108
(0.007) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
lnTDit-1 -14.354 -17.736 -16.000 -16.376 10.944
(0.007) (0.012) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007)
lnPOLit-1 -7.794 -7.723 -8.060 -8.810 11.736
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnTDit-1*lnPOLit-1 3.102 3.809 3.612 3.683 -3.108
(0.005) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
∆M2it-1 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.020
(0.041) (0.052) (0.034) (0.040) (0.124)
IRit-1 -0.560 -0.523 -0.700 -0.681 0.023
(0.103) (0.125) (0.080) (0.085) (0.936)
CPit-1 1.040 0.903 1.209 1.168 0.172
(0.319) (0.399) (0.227) (0.247) (0.883)
∆SPit-1 0.081 0.079 0.100 0.103 0.097
(0.350) (0.373) (0.240) (0.232) (0.352)
R2 0.498 0.497 0.494 0.496 0.467
Adjusted R2 0.408 0.407 0.404 0.407 0.357
C. Robustness Checks
In this section, we conduct robustness checks of our earlier reported empirical 
findings. Our approach is twofold. First, we use a different proxy to capture the 
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. More specifically, we use the total number 
of cases (per million, ln TC) instead of ln TD in Equation (2) as a proxy for the 
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 24, Number 3, 2021376
pandemic. These results are reported in Table 6. The remaining variables 
considered in the model remain same, except instead of interacting ln TD with 
ln POL, we now consider ln TC*ln POL to capture the combined effects of the 
COVID-19 pandemic and policy implementations during the pandemic. Our 
overall findings remain same, and we do conclude that implementing different 
policies during the pandemic helps in reducing the negative effects of COVID-19 
on industrial productivity of the panel of 50 countries.
Table 6. 
Using Total Cases per Million as a Measure of COVID-19
This table shows empirical evidence regarding whether policy responses moderated the impact of COVID-19 
(measured in terms of the total number of cases per million) on productivity growth across countries. We regress 
productivity (measured by annualized IP growth) on lags of lnTC, lnPOL, lnTC*lnPOL, ∆M2, IR, CP, and ∆SP. In 
Columns (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5), we include policy response indicators SI, SL, GI, CH, and ES, respectively. Coefficients 
and p-values are outside and inside parentheses, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 35.311 37.851 35.269 38.185 -65.307
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnTCit-1 -7.092 -9.353 -7.298 -7.494 9.852
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
lnPOLit-1 -7.680 -7.897 -8.331 -8.889 15.909
(0.030) (0.020) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
lnTCit-1*lnPOLit-1 1.605 2.070 1.752 1.779 -2.369
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
∆M2it-1 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.016
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IRit-1 -0.617 -0.594 -0.744 -0.734 -0.110
(0.100) (0.116) (0.084) (0.086) (0.764)
CPit-1 1.130 1.009 1.271 1.258 0.290
(0.262) (0.319) (0.189) (0.195) (0.801)
∆SPit-1 0.093 0.091 0.113 0.116 0.116
(0.274) (0.299) (0.186) (0.176) (0.273)
R2 0.491 0.492 0.488 0.489 0.463
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.401 0.398 0.399 0.352
Next, we consider using two alternative measures of our dependent variable, 
∆IP. Motivated by the literature (see Giordani, 2004; Bjørnland and Leitemo, 2009), 
instead of using annualized growth rate of industrial production, we use linear 
detrended IP (dIP) and the natural logarithm of IP (lnIP) as dependent variable in 
Equation 2, to check the consistency of our results.3 Results obtained using detrended 
IP and natural logarithm of IP are reported in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. We find 
3 This is slightly different from differencing the natural logarithm of IP, although both entails 
removing a trend in the IP series. When detrending IP, we regress IP on the trend and subtract the 
best fit line from IP (or extract the error term from the regression). Differencing IP entails subtracting 
the previous value of IP (IPt-1) from the current value (IPt ). Differencing removes trends but produces 
non-white noise error terms, whereas detrending by least squares introduces autocorrelations if IP 
follows a random walk. For a detailed discussion, refer to Chan, Hayya, and Ord (1977). 
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that irrespective of the use of different measures of IP, our main conclusion does 
not change. That is, the impact of the pandemic and policy response indicators on 
productivity remains negative and statistically significant. Besides, the interactive 
variable, ln TD*ln POL, is found to be positive and statistically significant, which 
again implies that the implementation of different policies during the pandemic 
curtailed the negative effects of COVID-19 on countries industrial productivity.
Table 7. 
Using Detrended IP as a Measure of Industrial Productivity
This table shows empirical evidence regarding whether policy responses moderated the impact of COVID-19 on 
productivity growth across countries. We regress productivity (measured by detrended IP, dIP) on lags of lnTD, 
lnPOL, lnTD*lnPOL, ∆M2, IR, CP, and ∆SP. In Columns (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5), we include policy response indicators 
SI, SL, GI, CH, and ES, respectively. Coefficients and p-values are outside and inside parentheses, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 0.385 0.378 0.299 0.327 -0.136
(0.040) (0.032) (0.048) (0.064) (0.457)
lnTDit-1 -0.117 -0.143 -0.144 -0.127 0.018
(0.084) (0.113) (0.018) (0.058) (0.729)
lnPOLit-1 -0.087 -0.083 -0.069 -0.075 0.044
(0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.026) (0.401)
lnTDit-1*lnPOLit-1 0.026 0.031 0.033 0.029 -0.008
(0.048) (0.082) (0.008) (0.036) (0.582)
∆M2it-1 2.E-04 2.E-04 2.E-04 2.E-04 2.E-04
(0.076) (0.067) (0.045) (0.066) (0.136)
IRit-1 -4.E-04 -1.E-04 -0.002 -0.001 0.004
(0.818) (0.944) (0.433) (0.507) (0.022)
CPit-1 -5.E-05 -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.007
(0.995) (0.921) (0.765) (0.793) (0.559)
∆SPit-1 1.E-04 1.E-04 1.E-04 2.E-04 -2.E-04
(0.917) (0.920) (0.903) (0.861) (0.905)
R2 0.825 0.824 0.823 0.823 0.833
Adjusted R2 0.793 0.792 0.791 0.791 0.797
Table 8. 
Using the Natural Logarithm of IP as a Measure of Industrial Productivity
This table shows empirical evidence regarding whether policy responses moderated the impact of COVID-19 on 
productivity growth across countries. We regress productivity (measured by the natural logarithm of IP, lnIP) on 
lags of lnTD, lnPOL, lnTD*lnPOL, ∆M2, IR, CP, and ∆SP. In Columns (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5), we include policy 
response indicators SI, SL, GI, CH, and ES, respectively. Coefficients and p-values are outside and inside parentheses, 
respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 5.049 5.043 4.963 4.992 4.532
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnTDit-1 -0.117 -0.143 -0.144 -0.127 0.018
(0.084) (0.113) (0.018) (0.058) (0.729)
lnPOLit-1 -0.087 -0.083 -0.069 -0.075 0.044
(0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.026) (0.401)
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Table 8. 
Using the Natural Logarithm of IP as a Measure of Industrial Productivity 
(Continued)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lnTDit-1*lnPOLit-1 0.026 0.031 0.033 0.029 -0.008
(0.048) (0.082) (0.008) (0.036) (0.582)
∆M2it-1 2.E-04 2.E-04 2.E-04 2.E-04 2.E-04
(0.076) (0.067) (0.045) (0.066) (0.136)
IRit-1 -4.E-04 -1.E-04 -0.002 -0.001 0.004
(0.818) (0.944) (0.433) (0.507) (0.022)
CPit-1 -5.E-05 -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.007
(0.995) (0.921) (0.765) (0.793) (0.559)
∆SPit-1 1.E-04 1.E-04 1.E-04 2.E-04 -2.E-04
(0.917) (0.920) (0.903) (0.861) (0.905)
R2 0.830 0.829 0.828 0.828 0.837
Adjusted R2 0.799 0.798 0.797 0.797 0.803
IV. CONCLUSION
The theory suggests that a negative shock like the COVID-19 would reduce 
industrial productivity around the globe, and in fact empirical evidence supports 
this prediction. The pandemic has negatively impacted productivity around the 
world. In attempt to prevent COVID-19 from further spreading and to tackle its 
negative ramifications on economies, policymakers introduced various policy 
measures including lockdowns, bans on public gatherings and events, restrictive 
movements, face covering, border closures, stimulus packages, interest rate 
reductions, among others. Prior studies have assessed whether such policy 
responses mitigated the negative consequences of the pandemic on various 
macroeconomic and financial activities. However, we have little knowledge 
regarding whether the policy responses moderated the negative impact of 
COVID-19 on industrial productivity, in particular. 
Our study addresses this research gap by regressing industrial productivity 
on COVID-19 and policy response indicators and the interaction of these 
indicators, considering a panel of the 50 most affected countries by the pandemic. 
We unearth the following findings. First, separately, the pandemic and the 
policy responses reduced industrial productivity. Absent the pandemic, some 
of the policy responses (i.e., lockdowns, bans on public gatherings and events, 
restrictive movements, face covering, border closures, etc.) hurt productivity in 
these countries and vice versa. Second, these policy responses do not only help 
reduce the COVID-19 spread, but they also succeed in moderating the negative 
impact of the pandemic on productivity and revert the economies to a positive 
productivity growth path. Third, we demonstrate that these findings are robust 
to, among others, the proxies of industrial productivity, COVID-19, and the policy 
responses. Our findings provide support for evidence-based policy responses 
in times of crises. An implication is that, when negative shocks hit economies, 
measured policies such as packages to assist businesses, stimulus packages to 
households to maintain smooth consumption, small but significant interest rate 
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cuts to reduce the cost of borrowing, etc. are necessary to keep them afloat. Such 
policies have both immediate and long-term positive spillovers and are social 
welfare enhancing. From a theoretical standpoint, our findings re-echo the need 
for an optimal policy mix to maintain economies on a steady growth path as 
previously documented in the macroeconomic policy literature.
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